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The Constitution contains many enumerated grants of congres1
sional power. Some of these grants, such as the Commerce Clause,
are extremely broad and contain no real limitations. Other grants,
2
3
such as the Bankruptcy Clause and the Copyright Clause, are much
narrower, concerning a specific type of law and limiting Congress’s
power to legislate. Some laws concern both a broad and a narrow
grant of power. In the situations where constitutional grants of
authority appear to overlap, both are relevant in determining whether
the Constitution grants Congress authority to pass a law.
Laws enacted under these circumstances raise an important and
difficult question of constitutional interpretation: when an enume1

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to enact “uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
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rated grant of power specifically addresses the realm of conduct that
Congress seeks to regulate but limits Congress’s authority to act, can
Congress instead act under a broader, alternative grant of power?
This complicated issue has been termed the problem of inter-clause
4
conflicts. The Supreme Court has confronted inter-clause conflicts
on only a handful of occasions in a variety of contexts, and it has been
inconsistent in its method of analysis, arriving at what some courts and
commentators consider to be contradictory conclusions. As a result,
lower courts have been left with little guidance on how to proceed in
the rare circumstances when this important question arises.
One of these circumstances is the relationship between the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause. Laws passed by Congress in
1994 that outlaw the “bootlegging” (i.e., the recording, trading, and
selling) of live musical performances present an inter-clause conflict.
Congress enacted the bootlegging ban in two forms: a civil provision,
5
which Congress added as Chapter 11 of the Copyright Act, and a
6
criminal provision. The statutes were included as part of the Uruguay
7
Round Agreements Act (URAA), which Congress enacted in order to
comply with the United States’ obligations under the Trade-Related
8
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), a massive intellectual prop9
erty treaty. The civil anti-bootlegging provision states that:

4

See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’
Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 468-69
(2007) (describing the tension between congressional authority under the Commerce
and Copyright Clauses as an “inter-clause conflict”).
5
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (treating unauthorized recordings of live performances as equivalent to traditional copyright infringement).
6
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (authorizing up to five years in prison, fines, and forfeiture
of equipment for first bootlegging offenses).
7
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.).
8
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, at Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994,
108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
9
The history of the anti-bootlegging statutes, the URAA, and TRIPs is complex.
As Melville and David Nimmer explain,
In 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act added to the picture a very brief
Chapter 11, consisting of only one section. That section regulates the unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos. . . . In
order to comply with the obligations of the United States as a signatory to the
TRIPs annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement, Congress added
this protection for such performances.
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8E.01[B] (2010)
(footnotes omitted); see also Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers: Recognizing the Uru-
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Anyone who, without the consent of the performer or performers
involved—
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance
in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of
such a performance from an unauthorized fixation,
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or
sounds and images of a live musical performance, or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States,
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 505, to
10
the same extent as an infringer of copyright.

guay Round Agreement Act’s Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a Constitutional Exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause Authority, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 673, 678-83 (2007) (providing a detailed history of American anti-bootlegging statutes and the international
agreements that preceded them).
The URAA’s relationship to TRIPs may implicate a theoretical issue of Congress’s
authority under the treaty power. Had the anti-bootlegging statutes been passed to
enforce a ratified treaty, a very difficult and interesting question regarding the effect of
the treaty power on other constitutional limitations (here, the limitations of the Copyright Clause) would have arisen. See generally Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty
Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079 (2006) (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes are
constitutional under the treaty power and that an analysis of the conflict between the
Copyright Clause and Commerce Clause is unnecessary).
This argument, however, ignores the complexity of the URAA’s history. One can
reach the issue of Congress’s authority under the treaty power only if there is a valid
treaty on which the power can be invoked. The Senate never ratified TRIPs; rather,
Congress elected merely to comply with TRIPs through domestic legislation:
Chapter 11 implements the TRIPs protocol, which in turn mandates compliance with selected provisions of the Rome Convention [to which] [t]he
United States does not adhere . . . . And Congress explicitly decided not to ratify any treaty when it enacted the [URAA], concluding that all that needed to
be done was accomplished by the domestic legislation. There is therefore no
treaty on which to hang an invocation of treaty authority.
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 8E.05[A] (footnotes omitted); see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 18.06[C][3][b] (“Both the Administration and Congress proceeded on
the basis that all that needed to be accomplished was effectuated through the [URAA]
itself; no treaty was presented to the Senate for United States accession.”). Thus, it appears highly questionable whether the treaty power serves as an alternative constitutional basis for Congress to enact the URAA. This theoretical and underdeveloped
constitutional question goes well beyond the scope of this Comment but is worthy of
exploration in future scholarship.
10
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
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The criminal anti-bootlegging provision is identical in its application, except that it adds an additional requirement: that the actions
be taken “knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or
11
private financial gain.”
The anti-bootlegging statutes provide a perfect model for confronting the question of constitutional inter-clause conflicts. Although Congress passed both provisions to comply with an intellectual
property treaty and placed the civil provision within the same title as
the Copyright Act, the anti-bootlegging statutes depart from traditional copyright law in a number of respects. First, the protections the statutes offer are very similar to copyright, yet they do not provide the
12
full protections and rights that traditional copyright law affords.
Second, and more importantly, the anti-bootlegging statutes concern
unfixed performances, and the rights the statutes grant are perpe13
tual. This is unlike all prior federal copyright laws in American his14
tory. Fixation and a limited term of protection are widely regarded
15
as requirements for protection under the Copyright Clause. It thus
appears highly probable that if the anti-bootlegging statutes are examined solely under the Copyright Clause (i.e., without regard to other constitutional provisions), they will be found unconstitutional.
However, because the trading or selling of recordings of live musical
performances undoubtedly affects interstate and foreign commerce, if
the anti-bootlegging statutes are viewed solely under the Commerce

11

18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a).
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][1] (“The unfixed musical performances protected under Chapter 11 are accorded something approximating, but
not equaling, copyright protection.”).
13
See id. § 8E.01[B] (“Chapter 11 relates solely to unfixed matters.”); id.
§ 8E.03[C][3] (noting possible constitutional objections to the statute’s grant of
perpetual rights).
14
See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 313-81 (7th ed. 2006) (providing an overview of the duration and termination of terms of protection under American copyright
law); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.01[B] (“The federalization of control over
unfixed productions departs from several centuries of American jurisprudence, given
that regulation of activities lacking fixation has traditionally been the realm of state law
protection. In that sense, this last chapter represents a greater departure from constitutional moorings than the predecessor additions.” (footnotes omitted)).
15
See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.08[C][2] (“[I]n order for a work
to constitute a writing, it must be embodied in some tangible form. If the word ‘writings’ is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote ‘some
material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.’” (footnote omitted)); see also generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-208
(2003) (analyzing whether the Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutionally
grants perpetual rights).
12
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Clause (i.e., without regard to the Copyright Clause), they will likely
be deemed constitutional. Therefore, the anti-bootlegging statutes
present an apt example for exploring inter-clause conflicts and for
analyzing potential solutions to that problem.
A handful of courts have ruled on the constitutionality of the antibootlegging statutes and have addressed the constitutional interclause conflict question. In some cases, courts have addressed the
criminal provision’s constitutionality, reaching different conclusions
using different reasoning. In cases addressing the civil provision’s
constitutionality, courts have also reached different conclusions using different reasoning. A number of commentators have taken issue with these decisions and their methods of analysis, some proposing alternative approaches.
In this Comment, I offer a method of constitutional analysis that I
have termed “holistic categorization” as a possible solution to the
problem of constitutional inter-clause conflicts. This method is
grounded in a view of the Constitution as an entity greater than the
sum of its parts, in which the relationship between clauses must be
considered in its interpretation. I propose a two-step analysis under
this approach. First, it must be determined whether the statute at issue falls within the scope of a given constitutional power. This determination relies upon a general conception of the scope of the relevant
clause based upon its text and underlying policy. It also requires an
understanding of what the statute at issue directly does, as well as the
statute’s legislative history and construction. Second, once the applicable constitutional powers have been identified, it must be determined
whether the statute violates the constitutional limitations upon those
powers. This method comports with Supreme Court precedent and,
when applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes, finds that the statutes are
unconstitutional under the limitations of the Copyright Clause.
In Part I of this Comment, I will introduce and discuss the approaches to inter-clause conflicts that courts have taken in the context
of the anti-bootlegging statutes, as well as the Supreme Court opinions
to which these courts have looked for guidance outside of the bootlegging context. In Part II, I present my own categorization of the various existing and proposed approaches to inter-clause conflicts, providing other scholars’ commentary on the approaches and offering
my own criticisms. In Part III, I offer holistic categorization as a new
method of constitutional interpretation for inter-clause conflicts. I
present the approach in detail and justify each of its rules and factors,
grounding the approach in well-established, fundamental principles
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of constitutional interpretation. Finally, in Part IV I apply holistic categorization to the anti-bootlegging statutes and find that the statutes
are unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.
I. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES
Five federal district and circuit courts have discussed the specific
question of whether the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the Copyright Clause. Some cases address the criminal provision, and others
address the civil provision. Although two district courts held the provisions to be unconstitutional (one addressing the criminal provision
and the other the civil provision), both decisions were later reversed.
In all five of the opinions, the courts looked to essentially the same
Supreme Court precedent for guidance on how to approach the constitutional question of overlapping enumerated powers, but each interpreted the Court’s decisions somewhat differently. In this Part, I
discuss each opinion in turn.
A. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Moghadam
The first court to address the constitutionality of either antibootlegging statute was the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Moghadam, which held the criminal anti-bootlegging statute to be a valid ex16
ercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. In the
case, Ali Moghadam was indicted for violating the anti-bootlegging
17
statute. His motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the
statute was unconstitutional was denied, and he pled guilty to the
18
crime. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, he again raised the issue
19
of constitutionality.
In its opinion, the court addressed whether the statute could be a
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause. In
doing so, the court looked only to the generally accepted fixation requirement (interpreted from the term “Writings” in the Clause),
which was the sole ground upon which Moghadam argued unconstitu20
tionality. Although the court acknowledged the anti-bootlegging sta16

175 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1271.
18
Id. at 1271-73. In denying Moghadam’s motion to dismiss, the district court
does not appear to have issued a written opinion explaining its ruling.
19
Id.
20
See id. at 1273 (“Of these limitations, Moghadam has relied in the instant case
only on the concept of ‘fixation’ which is said to be embedded in the term ‘Writ17
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tute’s potential conflict with the Clause, the court declined to decide
the question and chose instead to assume arguendo that the Copyright Clause was not a valid source of congressional authority to pass
21
the anti-bootlegging statute.
Proceeding on this assumption, the court considered whether the
statute could instead fall within Congress’s power to regulate interstate
22
and foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause. The court determined that, although Congress believed it was acting under the
Copyright Clause and included “no jurisdictional element as is commonly found in criminal statutes passed under authority of the Commerce Clause,” the statute was nonetheless a valid exercise of the
23
The court explained that “[t]he link between
Commerce Clause.
bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce and commerce with
24
foreign nations is self-evident.”
After setting the stage, the court moved to the fundamental question of constitutional interpretation: “whether Congress can use its
Commerce Clause power to avoid the limitations that might prevent it
25
from passing the same legislation under the Copyright Clause.” The
court stated as a rule of constitutional interpretation:
In general, the various grants of legislative authority contained in the
Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed. In other
words, each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other
powers, and what cannot be done under one of them may very well be
26
doable under another.

As support for this proposition, the court offered the Supreme
Court’s influential decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
27
States. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court considered the

ings.’”). Interestingly, in a footnote, the court wrote that the anti-bootlegging statutes
may violate the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause, but declined to
decide the question because the issue had not been preserved on appeal. Id. at 1274 n.9.
21
See id. at 1274 (acknowledging appellant’s fixation-requirement argument and
declining to address the issue because the court found an alternative source of power
for the enactment).
22
Id. at 1274-82.
23
Id. at 1275-77.
24
Id. at 1275-76.
25
Id. at 1277.
26
Id.
27
See id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964))
(identifying the Heart of Atlanta Motel opinion as “[p]erhaps the most prominent example of this principle”).
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constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin
29
in particular classes of businesses that serve the public. More than
eighty years earlier, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court had
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as unconstitutional because
Congress lacked authority to pass the law under either the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendments—the only sources of authority under
30
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Suwhich the government argued.
preme Court distinguished the Civil Rights Cases decision on multiple
31
grounds and held the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be a constitutional
32
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. To support its rule of constitutional interpretation, the Moghadam court
looked to the Supreme Court’s statement in Heart of Atlanta Motel that,
because the Commerce Clause gives Congress “ample power,”
we have therefore not considered the other grounds relied upon. This is
not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered
33
it alone.

Using this statement as guidance, the Moghadam court concluded
that “as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches beyond the
limits of one grant of legislative power has no bearing on whether it
34
can be sustained under another.” As additional support in the Copyright Clause context, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s 1879
opinion in the Trade-Mark Cases, which held that Congress lacked authority under either the Copyright Clause or the Commerce Clause to

28

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
29
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247-49 (explaining the challenged provisions of the Act).
30
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“[W]e are of opinion, that no
countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either
the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground
of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at
least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.”).
31
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-52 (declaring the decision in the Civil
Rights Cases “inapposite, and without precedential value in determining the constitutionality of the present Act”).
32
Id. at 261-62.
33
Id. at 250.
34
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999). Section II.B
of this Comment criticizes this reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel, and subsection III.B.3
offers a superior interpretation.

SILA REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1150

3/14/2011 12:29 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 159: 1141

35

pass a primitive trademark law. The Moghadam court argued that the
Court’s attention in the Trade-Mark Cases to both the Copyright Clause
and the Commerce Clause for authority was evidence “that legislation
which would not be permitted under the Copyright Clause could none36
theless be permitted under the Commerce Clause.”
The court conceded, however, that its proposed rule of constitutional interpretation—that each grant of legislative power is alternate
to all the others—was not absolute, acknowledging the Supreme
37
Court’s decision in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons. In Railway Labor, the Supreme Court held that a law concerning employee
protection during reorganization of a specific railroad company was
38
The Court stated
unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause.
that its analysis must begin by determining whether the law at issue
was an exercise of Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause or
39
whether it was an exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.
The Court acknowledged that the clauses were “closely related” but
concluded, after looking to the statute’s legislative history and its sub40
stance, that Congress passed the law under the Bankruptcy Clause.
As such, the Court held, the law was subject to the Bankruptcy
Clause’s uniformity requirement and the Commerce Clause could not
provide an alternative source of power: “[I]f we were to hold that
Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitu41
tion a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”
The Moghadam court reconciled Railway Labor with its stated general rule of constitutional interpretation by fashioning an exception
applicable when the statute at issue is “fundamentally inconsistent”
42
with the requirements of the narrower constitutional provision. The
court reasoned that because the Copyright Clause’s fixation requirement was a malleable concept and the anti-bootlegging statutes pro35

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94, 99 (1879).
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.
37
See id. at 1279-80 (“But the Railway Labor Executives case suggests that in some
circumstances the Commerce Clause cannot be used to eradicate a limitation placed
upon Congressional power in another grant of power.” (citing Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982))).
38
See Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 471-73.
39
Id. at 465.
40
See id. at 465-68.
41
Id. at 468-69. Part II and Section III.B discuss the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Railway Labor, which is very useful to the inter-clause conflict problem.
42
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1269.
36
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vided copyright-like protection, the criminal anti-bootlegging provision
was “not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation requirement of
43
the Copyright Clause.” The court provided no further guidance on
44
how this approach should be applied to other provisions.
B. The Martignon Decisions
Years after Moghadam, the Second Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the criminal anti-bootlegging provision in United States v.
Martignon. First, Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York held
45
the criminal anti-bootlegging provision to be unconstitutional. On
appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and
held the anti-bootlegging statute to be a constitutionally valid exercise
46
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
1. The District Court’s Opinion
In stark contrast to the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam, Judge Baer
used a rule of constitutional interpretation that required classification
of the statute at issue: “In order to establish whether the antibootlegging statute is constitutional, it is necessary to determine
47
whether the statute is a copyright law or a commercial regulation.”
As support for this rule of interpretation, Judge Baer cited the Su48
preme Court’s opinion in Railway Labor. Looking to the statute’s legislative history, wording, construction, and substance, Judge Baer concluded that the anti-bootlegging statute was “clearly a copyright-like
regulation” to be tested under the Copyright Clause, rather than the
49
50
Commerce Clause. Judge Baer distinguished the Trade-Mark Cases

43

Id.
Interestingly, the court noted that the anti-bootlegging statute may be fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement—
rather than the fixation requirement—but declined to decide that question because
the parties had not raised it. Id.
45
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
46
United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007).
47
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419. The court, at the end of its opinion, offered
the “fundamentally inconsistent” approach the Moghadam court used as an alternative
justification for its ruling, see id. at 428-29, but this was not the primary method of constitutional interpretation.
48
Id. at 420 (citing Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982)).
For a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Railway Labor, see supra Section I.A.
49
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22.
44
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from the anti-bootlegging statutes: “Here, unlike in the Trade-Mark
Cases, the anti-bootlegging statute falls squarely within the purview of
the Copyright Clause, and therefore, Congress is limited by the re51
strictions that the Copyright Clause imposes on its power.” He then
found the anti-bootlegging law to violate both the Copyright Clause’s
fixation requirement, because it regulates live, unfixed perfor52
mances, and the “limited Times” requirement, because its protection
53
lasts indefinitely. Thus, using his categorization method of constitu54
tional interpretation, he declared the statute to be unconstitutional.
2. The Second Circuit’s Opinion
On appeal, the Second Circuit sought to clarify the issue of constitutional interpretation that the anti-bootlegging statutes raise. After
exploring the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the
Trade-Mark Cases, and Railway Labor, the court presented a bifurcated
method of constitutional interpretation that it believed clearly synthesized Supreme Court precedent to resolve conflicts between the Copyright and Commerce Clauses: “Congress exceeds its power under the
Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause
only when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted
Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates
55
one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause.” Under this method of interpretation, for a statute to fall subject to the Copyright
Clause’s requirements, it must actually be a “copyright law,” rather
56
than being merely “like” copyright or “very close” to copyright. Using this framework, the Second Circuit concluded that the criminal
anti-bootlegging statute was not, in fact, a copyright law and thus was
57
not subject to the Copyright Clause’s requirements.
The court reached this conclusion based upon a comparative analysis of the Copyright Clause’s grant of power to “secur[e] . . . Right[s],”

50

100 U.S. 82 (1879). For a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the
Trade-Mark Cases, see supra Section I.A.
51
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
52
Id. at 423-24.
53
Id. at 424.
54
Id. at 428.
55
United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007).
56
Id. at 149-50.
57
See id. at 151 (stating that the statute “is not a law ‘secur[ing] . . . rights,’ nor is it
a copyright law” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). Subsection IV.A.1 of this
Comment criticizes the Second Circuit’s reasoning on this crucial question.
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the history of the Copyright Clause, and the substance of the criminal
anti-bootlegging statute.58 After finding the criminal anti-bootlegging
statute not to be a copyright law, the court held the statute to be a valid
59
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. This is the
most recent case to have decided the issue.
C. The KISS Decisions
In between the district court’s ruling and the Second Circuit’s ruling in the Martignon case, two separate district courts in the Central
District of California addressed the constitutionality of the civil antibootlegging statute—the only instance of such a challenge to date—in
60
the same case. KISS Catalog, Ltd., filed a civil suit against Passport International Productions, Inc., alleging that the defendant violated the
anti-bootlegging statute by distributing a DVD containing previously
unseen footage of a performance by the band KISS from their 1976
61
tour. In the first opinion, Judge Rea held the civil anti-bootlegging
62
statute to be unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause. However,
because of a procedural error in the order, Judge Rea agreed to recon63
sider the case. Judge Rea died before he could rehear the case, so the
64
case was transferred to the court of Judge Fischer, who vacated Judge
Rea’s order and found the civil anti-bootlegging statute to be constitu65
tional under the Commerce Clause.

58

See id. at 150-51 (discussing the substance of the anti-bootlegging statute and the
Copyright Clause’s text and history).
59
See id. at 152-53 (discussing the nexus between bootlegging and commerce and
concluding that the statute was within Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce).
60
See KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (KISS I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (detailing the factual history of the case), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
61
See id. at 825 (detailing the factual history of the case). It is unclear why anyone
would want such a video.
62
Id. at 836-37.
63
See KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc. (KISS II), 405 F. Supp. 2d
1169, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining that, because the court failed to notify the
Attorney General of the finding of unconstitutionality, Judge Rea granted a request by
the United States to rehear the case).
64
See id. (explaining the death of Judge Rea and subsequent transfer of the case to
Judge Fischer’s court).
65
Id. at 1171.

SILA REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1154

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

3/14/2011 12:29 PM

[Vol. 159: 1141

1. The KISS I Opinion
In his opinion in KISS I, Judge Rea began by determining whether
66
the civil anti-bootlegging statute was “copyright-like legislation.”
Judge Rea looked to Judge Baer’s analysis of the criminal statute in
Martignon and concluded that the civil provision was undoubtedly a
“copyright-related statute” that “seeks to offer copyright-like protections for recordings of live performances,” even more so than the
67
criminal provision. Judge Rea then applied the requirements of the
68
Copyright Clause to the anti-bootlegging statute.
Judge Rea acknowledged the difficult question of applying the fixation require69
ment and declined to answer it, but ruled that the statute unques70
tionably violated the “limited Times” requirement.
Against this backdrop, Judge Rea moved on to the question of
constitutional inter-clause conflicts and attempted to reconcile the
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, and Railway Labor. Judge Rea distinguished the Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta Motel, arguing that neither case implicated a direct conflict between the limitations of the Copyright Clause or
71
another power and the Commerce Clause. He reasoned that in the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court had merely held that “Congress had insufficient power, under both the Commerce and Copyright Clauses, to
enact federal trademark legislation,” and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the
Court “did not explicitly hold that Congress exceeded its power” un66

KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
Id. This is a different line of logic than the Second Circuit would follow in its
review of Judge Baer’s decision in Martignon. Judge Rea’s opinion predated the
Second Circuit’s review by almost three years. In its review, the Second Circuit decided
that to fall within the requirements of the Copyright Clause, the statute must be a copyright law, rather than being merely copyright-like. For a discussion of this opinion, see
supra subsection I.B.2. Subsection IV.A.1 discusses this crucial question.
68
KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 831-33. Judge Rea wrote that the Copyright Clause
only “contains two limitations with respect to copyright; the Copyright Clause protects
‘writings’ only ‘for limited Times.’” Id. at 831 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
Some commentators have argued that the Copyright Clause contains other limitations.
See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 492-94 (arguing that the Copyright Clause also contains
limits in its “Authors” term and its statement of purpose to promote the arts).
69
See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (“Since the allegedly unauthorized recording
has already been made, that existing recording may satisfy the fixation requirement.
Like the Moghadam court, this Court will not attempt to reach a conclusion on this
question.” (citations omitted)).
70
See id. at 833 (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord,
the Court holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like
protection in violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”).
71
Id. at 836.
67
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72

der the Fourteenth Amendment. He then declared “Railway Labor to
73
be the most instructive case on this issue.” Following Railway Labor,
Judge Rea held that the Commerce Clause could not be used to circumvent the limitations of the Copyright Clause:
The framers certainly believed that some limit on protection for copyrights and patents should exist; otherwise, they would not have included
the explicit limits contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Permitting the current
scope of the Commerce Clause to overwhelm those limitations altogeth74
er would be akin to a “repeal” of a provision of the Constitution.

Judge Rea also explicitly rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “fundamental
inconsistency” test from Moghadam, arguing that the Moghadam court’s
parsed reading of the Copyright Clause was misguided and rejecting
75
the standard the court used for the fixation requirement. Judge Rea
76
held the civil anti-bootlegging statute to be unconstitutional.
2. The KISS II Opinion
On rehearing, Judge Fischer approached the problem far differently, following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Moghadam almost entirely. Judge Fischer argued that the Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta Motel stood for the principle that “nothing prohibits Congress
from protecting similar things in different ways—so long as some provi77
sion of the United States Constitution allows it to do so.” She distinguished Railway Labor, arguing that the bankruptcy statute in that case
78
“was a bankruptcy statute—not a ‘bankruptcy-like’ statute.” However,
the anti-bootlegging statute, according to Judge Fischer, was only “copyright-like” or “copyright-related,” and thus “[did] not fall within the
79
purview of the Copyright Clause.” Judge Fischer also followed the Eleventh Circuit’s “fundamental inconsistency” test and argued that the
anti-bootlegging statute did not “negate any of the purposes of, protec80
tions afforded by, or limitations established by, the Copyright Clause.”
81
She vacated the KISS I order, holding the statute constitutional.
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. In Section II.B, I argue that this is the proper reading of both cases.
Id.
Id. at 837.
See id. at 837 n.11 (responding directly to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning).
Id. at 837.
KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1177.
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II. ASSESSING THE EXISTING AND PROPOSED METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
As the anti-bootlegging cases and Supreme Court cases like the
Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Railway Labor demonstrate, there are varying approaches to inter-clause conflicts, the rare
situations in which a narrow enumerated power overlaps with a
broader enumerated power. Unfortunately, courts rarely identify
their approaches as distinct methods, and even the similar approaches
vary in both theory and application. Several commentators have at82
tempted to classify these approaches, and in this Part, I offer my own
classifications. I have divided the existing approaches into three
rough categories: the strict categorization approach, the strictly alternative approach, and the fundamental inconsistency approach. Within each of these categories, recognized variances exist. Furthermore,
in many instances the cases I have labeled as following a particular
approach do not fit squarely within the category I have identified;
courts have often incorporated principles from other approaches or
justified their decisions under multiple approaches. Nonetheless, I
believe the categories I have created represent a concise and useful
means of analyzing constitutional inter-clause conflicts.
A. The Strict Categorization Approach
In determining whether a statute can be constitutional under a
broader power, many courts have begun their analysis by determining
under which singular clause of the Constitution the statute at issue falls
and then applying only that clause’s requirements and limitations. This
approach can be termed the “strict categorization approach.” Other
commentators have referred to this approach merely as “categoriza83
84
tion” or placed the approach within a more general label, but such a
generalized view of the approach obscures a characteristic distinct from

82

See e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 495-507 (dividing the approaches to resolving
inter-clause conflicts into five categories); William McGinty, Note, Not a Copyright Law?
United States v. Martignon and Why the Anti-Bootlegging Provisions Are Unconstitutional, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 332-39 (2008) (arguing that the approaches courts have taken can be divided into three categories: solitary analysis, categorization, and fundamental inconsistency).
83
See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 82, at 334.
84
See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 496-97 (placing the strict categorization approach
within a larger category Oliar terms “formalism”).
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85

other modes of categorization : the strict categorization approach refuses to accept that multiple enumerated powers may be applicable to a
given statute, instead forcing the statute to fit within a singular power.
Many courts have used the strict categorization approach to resolve
inter-clause conflicts. The most notable case to take this approach is
86
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Railway Labor. In Railway Labor, the
Supreme Court plainly declared: “[i]t is necessary first to determine
whether the labor protection provisions of amended RITA are an exercise of Congress’ power under the Bankruptcy Clause, as contended by
appellees, or under the Commerce Clause, as contended by appellant
87
and the United States.” Even after acknowledging the close relationship between the Bankruptcy Clause and the Commerce Clause, the
Court stated that it would look only to the Bankruptcy Clause in its
analysis, because otherwise, “we would eradicate from the Constitution
88
a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”
Following Railway Labor’s lead, the district court in Martignon began its analysis by stating that it was first necessary to classify the antibootlegging statute as either a copyright law or a commercial regula89
tion. The Second Circuit also followed this approach in its reversal
of the district court’s decision, concluding that the anti-bootlegging
statute was not a copyright law and thus judging the statute under the
90
Commerce Clause alone.
Similarly, both the KISS I and KISS II courts began their analyses
by determining whether the anti-bootlegging statute was a copyright

85

In this Comment, I propose that such an alternate mode of categorization (a
“nonstrict” or “liberal” categorization) exists and is the most useful method of constitutional interpretation for resolving inter-clause conflicts. Thus, the distinction between
“strict categorization” and categorization more generally is very important. Part III
discusses my proposed method of interpretation.
86
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). For a discussion of the
facts of the case and the analysis in the opinion, see supra Section I.A. While the Supreme Court did, in fact, apply a strict categorization approach, I find that the Court
nonetheless reached the proper result due to the lack of limitations within the Commerce Clause. See infra note 180.
87
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465.
88
Id. at 469.
89
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
90
See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We therefore
conclude that it was not enacted under the Copyright Clause. We have no need to examine whether it violates limits of the Copyright Clause and proceed instead to an examination of its sustainability under the Commerce Clause.”).
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91

law or a commercial regulation. The KISS I court found that because
the statute was “copyright-like,” it fell only within the authority of the
92
Copyright Clause. In KISS II, the court followed a similar approach
but arrived at a different result, concluding that the anti-bootlegging
statute did not “fall within the purview of the Copyright Clause, [and
thus the court] need no longer consider whether it complies with the
93
limitations of the Copyright Clause.”
The strict categorization approach, while importantly recognizing
the need to determine the applicability of constitutional clauses, is
flawed. The approach operates under the incorrect assumption that
each statute fits neatly within a single enumerated power. The strict
categorization approach ignores the reality that many statutes concern
more than one realm of constitutional power. Critics have justly criti94
cized the approach on this ground.
This conceptual problem is particularly evident with regard to the
anti-bootlegging statutes. The anti-bootlegging statutes concern both
95
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause. The district courts
in Martignon and KISS I advanced the incredulous claim that the
Commerce Clause is to be ignored when discussing the constitutionali96
ty of the anti-bootlegging statutes. The anti-bootlegging statutes surely meet the low threshold for falling within the realm of the Commerce
97
Clause. It is impossible to deny that some statutes, particularly the
anti-bootlegging statutes, fall within multiple enumerated powers.

91

See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172-73 (C.D. Cal. 2005); KISS I, 350 F. Supp.
2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
92
KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833-37.
93
KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
94
See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 82, at 348 (arguing that categorization “has the
disadvantage . . . of pigeonholing statutes so that they are analyzed under only one part
of the Constitution, when they may actually relate to several areas of the law”).
95
My contention here that the anti-bootlegging statutes concern the Copyright
Clause is controversial, as many courts and commentators have held that the statutes do
not fall within the realm of copyright. Part IV fleshes out in greater detail my argument
that the statutes concern both the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause. Other
commentators have expressed concerns similar to my criticism of the strict categorization approach. See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 496 (arguing that the categorization approach is weak, particularly in the anti-bootlegging context, because “[t]he statutes . . . have the characteristics of both intellectual property and foreign commerce”).
96
See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37; United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp.
2d 413, 424-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
97
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 1999) (reasoning, in great detail, that the criminal provision falls within the Commerce Clause
because of its “self-evident” link to interstate and foreign commerce).
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Comparing the anti-bootlegging decisions reveals the other significant flaw with the strict categorization approach: courts following the approach can logically reach opposite results by manipulating the realm of activity that a given enumerated power addresses. A
comparison of the district and appellate opinions in Martignon provides an apt example of this manipulation. Although the district
court and the Second Circuit used the same method of constitutional interpretation, the courts reached opposite results. The district
court placed the criminal anti-bootlegging statute within the Copyright Clause category because the statute was “clearly a copyright-like
98
regulation.” The Second Circuit, however, placed the statute within the Commerce Clause category because it was not a true copyright
99
law. The crucial difference between the district court’s reasoning
and the Second Circuit’s reasoning was not the content of the antibootlegging statute itself; rather, the courts actually disagreed over
the scope of the Copyright Clause category.
The district court in Martignon construed the realm of the Copyright Clause broadly. Under its construction, any statute that is “copyright-like” is categorized as copyright and falls subject to the Copyright
100
Clause’s limitations.
The Second Circuit, however, constructed the
realm of the Copyright Clause very narrowly. Under its construction,
a statute is categorized under the Copyright Clause (and thus subject
101
to its requirements and limitations) only if it is a pure copyright law.
The statute completely avoids the Copyright Clause’s limitations if it
does not fall within the narrow definition of copyright, no matter how
similar the law is to that definition. This example illustrates that the
strict categorization approach leaves a crucial question unanswered:
how broadly should each constitutional clause’s category be construed? The answer to this question is the turning point in determining constitutionality, and courts have failed to provide sufficient justi102
fication for one route over another.

98

Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding
that the statute is not “a copyright law”).
100
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22.
101
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 150-51.
102
My proposed method of holistic categorization entirely rejects the Second Circuit’s narrow view that a statute does not fall within the scope of a specific power if it
approximates the subject matter concerned. See infra subsection III.B.2.
99
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B. The Strictly Alternative Approach
In contrast to the strict categorization approach, a different view
of the Constitution holds that each of its enumerated powers is entirely alternative. Under this method of constitutional interpretation, a
statute is a constitutionally valid exercise of congressional authority if
any power can be found to authorize it, irrespective of any other powers’ limitations. If courts applied this method to the anti-bootlegging
statutes, the statutes would be held constitutional under the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether they fall within the realm of the
Copyright Clause’s authority and regardless of whether they violate
the Copyright Clause’s requirements.
Case law does not support the “strictly alternative approach,” a
relatively extreme interpretation of the Constitution. At least one
commentator has argued that the Supreme Court followed the strictly
103
alternative approach in Heart of Atlanta Motel, but such an argument
is difficult to make. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court
upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by
certain classes of business establishments that served the public, as a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
104
Clause. This ruling came more than eighty years after the Civil Rights
Cases, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of
1875 as unconstitutional because Congress lacked authority to pass the
law under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment—the only
105
sources of authority under which the government argued. In Heart of
Atlanta Motel, the Supreme Court distinguished the 1875 Act from the
1964 Act and pointed to limiting language in the Civil Rights Cases to
conclude that the decision was “without precedential value in determin106
The Court declined to
ing the constitutionality of the present Act.”
address whether the Act could be sustained under any other provision
103

See McGinty, supra note 82, at 333-34 (arguing that Heart of Atlanta Motel
represents a clear example of the “solitary analysis approach,” which the author defines as holding that “the statute is constitutionally valid so long as one of the powers
standing alone is sufficient to uphold it”).
104
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247-61 (1964)
(explaining the details of Title II and holding it constitutional).
105
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“On the whole we are of opinion,
that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found
in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other
ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared
void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.”).
106
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250-52.
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of the Constitution—namely Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend107
ment—and instead held the Act valid under the Commerce Clause.
To read the Court’s opinion as an endorsement of the strictly alternative approach, one must understand it to mean that even if the Court
had found the Civil Rights Act to violate Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it would not matter because the Act was constitutional
under an alternate source of power—the Commerce Clause. Nothing
in the Court’s opinion, however, suggests this.
A more plausible reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel is not that the
Court failed to rule whether the Act violated Section 5, but rather that
the Court declined to address whether the Civil Rights Act fell within
108
the scope or realm of Congress’s Section 5 power. The Court’s opinion
supports this reading, since it points to language in the Civil Rights
Cases stating that the decision was limited to the scope of the Thir109
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court in the Civil Rights
Cases reasoned that the action Congress took—the regulation of private parties—was not within the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which the Court held to be limited to regulating state
110
This nuanced distinction between finding a statute
action only.
beyond the scope of a power and finding a statute to violate a power is
111
crucial and must be understood. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
determined that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not within the scope
of Congress’s Section 5 power. In effect, the Court would have
107

See id. at 250 (“This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which
[Congress] acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but
merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have
considered it alone.”).
108
This reading of Heart of Atlanta Motel comports with the method of holistic
categorization I propose in subsection III.B.3.
109
Id. at 251-52 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18).
110
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19 (“What we have to decide is, whether such
plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment;
and, in our judgment, it has not.”); id. (“And whether Congress, in the exercise of its
power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law
regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also a
question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in
any such view.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289 (3d ed. 2006)
(“The Court also held [in the Civil Rights Cases] that Congress lacked authority to enact
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court broadly declared that
the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to government action and that therefore it
cannot be used by Congress to regulate private behavior.”).
111
This distinction is inherent in the categorization approach that I have identified
in its strict form, see supra Section II.A, and propose in modified form, see infra Part III. In
the first step of a categorization analysis, one determines whether a statute falls within the
scope of the power, and in the second step, one determines whether that power is violated.
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reached the same holding if the government had claimed, for example,
that the Spending Clause granted Congress authority to pass the law:
the Court would not have held that the Spending Clause was violated;
rather, it would have held that it was beyond the Spending Clause’s
scope. As a counterexample, had the Act restricted state action—rather
than private action—but done so beyond what was congruent and proportional to the harm it sought to remedy, the Act would violate Section
112
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than exceed its scope.
113
Like Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Trade-Mark Cases can be misread as
endorsing the strictly alternative approach to the Constitution. In the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court did not follow the strictly alternative approach and reason that regardless of whether the trademark statute at issue violated the Copyright Clause, it could plausibly be sus114
tained under the Commerce Clause. A proper reading of the TradeMark Cases recognizes that the Court did not even reach the question of
the requirements of the Copyright Clause, because it concluded that
the trademark statute did not fall within the realm of the Clause: “The
ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery. . . . [W]e are unable to see any such power in the constitutional
provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and dis115
116
coveries.” Some courts have recognized this important distinction.
A true strictly alternative approach would be an extreme and
deeply flawed interpretation of the Constitution. The approach
would eviscerate explicit, unquestionable limitations that the Framers
included in the Constitution. This explains why the Supreme Court
emphatically rejected this approach in Railway Labor:
112

Of course, the doctrine of congruence and proportionality developed long after the Civil Rights Cases, but this is irrelevant for purposes of my counterexample. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 296-300 (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), and the doctrine of congruence and proportionality).
113
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
114
Id. at 95-99. Subsection III.B.3 of this Comment discusses this reading of the
Trade-Mark Cases within the context of my proposed method of holistic categorization.
115
Id. at 94.
116
See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Therefore, the Supreme Court’s analysis [in the Trade-Mark Cases] does not suggest
that Congress may enact legislation that falls within the purview but not the power of
the Copyright Clause, under its Commerce Clause authority. Rather, the Trade-Mark
Cases establish the non-controversial point that when Congress does not regulate in the
field covered by the Copyright Clause, it may look to an alternative grant of power.”),
vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had
insufficient power, under both the Commerce and Copyright Clauses, to enact federal
trademark legislation.”), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue
that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under
the Commerce Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy
Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United
States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required
by the Commerce Clause. Thus, if we were to hold that Congress had
the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on
117
the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.

The Supreme Court’s valid criticism of the strictly alternative approach in the bankruptcy context applies to copyright as well. If applied to the copyright context, the strictly alternative approach would
hold that any copyright law—pure or copyright-like—could avoid the
limitations of the Copyright Clause altogether and be constitutional
under the Commerce Clause. The Copyright Act itself (unquestionably a copyright law) could be amended to remove all term limits—in
clear violation of the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright
Clause—but still be held constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
That the Supreme Court did not even mention the possibility of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause in its consideration of the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 is a tes118
tament to the unacceptability of this approach.
Under the strictly alternative approach, narrow, limited grants of
authority that overlap with broad powers would be effectively repealed. This outcome is unacceptable. The Constitution’s provisions
cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The Constitution establishes an entire
government, with varying powers and limitations that relate between
branches and within branches. For it to have meaning, its provisions
119
must be interpreted in light of the other provisions, and the strictly
alternative approach fails to do so.
C. The Fundamental Inconsistency Approach
The “fundamental inconsistency approach” to inter-clause con120
flicts, first used by the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam, attempts to
117

Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982) (citations
omitted).
118
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (judging the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998’s constitutionality under only the Copyright Clause).
119
Subsection III.B.1 further explores and supports this assertion.
120
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
the criminal anti-bootlegging provision constitutional because it is “copyright-like” leg-
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remedy the flaws of the strict categorization and strictly alternative
approaches by treating the Constitution’s clauses as alternative while
still viewing the Constitution as a whole. Under the fundamental inconsistency approach, courts consider the Constitution’s powers in the
alternative unless there is a “fundamental inconsistency” between a statute passed under one power and the language or policy of another.
This approach comes in two forms, which I have identified as the
“clause-bound form” and the “fundamental policy form.” Courts have
used the clause-bound form in the anti-bootlegging context, most notably in the Moghadam decision, and the fundamental policy form outside of the anti-bootlegging context. Commentators have advocated
for the latter form. Though this approach is appealing on its face, further exploration reveals it to be unacceptably flawed.
1. The Clause-Bound Form
In its clause-bound form, the fundamental inconsistency approach
looks to the language of the narrow constitutional provision that overlaps with the broad provision and determines which elements of the
121
provision are “constitutive” and which are “limiting.” “Constitutive”
elements of a clause help to define the scope of the clause’s applicability; they are used to determine whether a statute falls within a clause’s
realm. “Limiting” elements define the requirements of the power;
122
they are used to determine whether the clause has been violated.
Once the scope of a power has been separated from its requirements,
courts must determine whether the statute violates those requirements and, if so, whether those requirements are fundamental or if
the statute is otherwise fundamentally inconsistent with the clause.
The Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam essentially took this approach,
though it also incorporated elements of the fundamental policy form.
The court looked to the Copyright Clause and determined that the
term “Writings,” which is the source of the fixation requirement, defined the scope of the grant of power: “The grant itself is stated in

islation that “is not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation requirement of the
Copyright Clause”); see also Oliar, supra note 4, at 497-98 (“The anti-bootlegging cases
include a potentially more promising approach to resolving inter-clause conflicts: the
fundamental inconsistency test adopted in Moghadam and used by the other antibootlegging courts.”).
121
Dotan Oliar created the terms “constitutive” and “limiting” to describe the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Moghadam. See Oliar, supra note 4, at 498.
122
For a detailed discussion of my distinction between scope of a power and violation of its requirements, see supra Section II.B.
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positive terms, and does not imply any negative pregnant that suggests
that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on Congress’ ability to
123
After this determination, the
legislate pursuant to other grants.”
court concluded that because other legislation had significantly lowered the threshold for fixation, the anti-bootlegging statutes that
124
protected unfixed works were not “fundamentally inconsistent.”
In his KISS I opinion, Judge Rea astutely criticized the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach, noting that its characterization of the “Writings”
term as constitutive could not be reconciled with Railway Labor. He
wrote, “[T]he uniformity ‘requirement’ is similarly a positive statement and does not necessarily imply a negative pregnant, i.e., the
Bankruptcy Clause does not state that Congress may not enact non125
uniform bankruptcy laws.” But Judge Rea’s criticism of the Eleventh
Circuit, however valid, is not fatal to the method itself, because it attacks only the Eleventh Circuit’s application.
Dotan Oliar, however, has offered a valid criticism of the method
itself. Oliar essentially argues that the clause-bound form is a fait accompli:
If qualifying language is characterized as “constitutive,” then harmony
between it and the statute will be found by assumption: language that
does not prevent something does not conflict with it. But the lack of a
conflict assuming that language is not limiting cannot serve as a basis for
126
concluding that it is not limiting.

While it is important to recognize the difference between the realm of
a grant of power and limitations on that grant—as I have emphasized
in Section III.B and as the clause-bound form also does—this distinction cannot serve as the dispositive factor in the constitutional inquiry.
Oliar’s demonstration that the clause-bound form employs circular
logic is fatal to this form of the fundamental inconsistency approach.

123

Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
See id. at 1281-82 (concluding that because “fixation, as a constitutional concept, is something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power,” unfixed
works can be protected pursuant to the Commerce Clause without being “fundamentally inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause). The court’s consideration of the importance of fixation—even after it determined that fixation was a constitutive element—is
more similar to the fundamental policy approach, which subsection II.C.2 will discuss.
125
KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
126
Oliar, supra note 4, at 498-99.
124
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2. The Fundamental Policy Form
The fundamental policy form of the fundamental inconsistency
approach is a marginally more sensible approach to the problem of
inter-clause conflicts. In this form, to determine constitutionality one
looks to the underlying policy values of the narrow, restrictive grant of
power and determines whether the statute at issue violates or significantly undermines those values. If so, the statute is unconstitutional
127
only if the violated policy value is “fundamental.”
Although Oliar appears to have entirely distinguished the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Moghadam from the fundamental policy
128
form, I argue that by weighing the importance of the fixation element of the Copyright Clause, the Moghadam court incorporated some
of the fundamental policy form into its analysis. The court ruled that
fixation was not a “rigid, inflexible barrier” in delineating between
copyrightable works, and thus it was inconsequential that anti129
bootlegging statutes protected unfixed works. Implicit in this finding
was a determination that broadening the scope of protected works to
include unfixed works did not violate any fundamental value inherent
130
As an example of the fundamental policy
in the Copyright Clause.
form, commentators typically cite an opinion by a Northern District of
California court that upheld certain sections of the Digital Millennium
131
Copyright Act (DMCA) as constitutional under the Commerce
132
Clause. In that case, the court acknowledged that the DMCA provisions at issue threatened certain copyright law values, namely fair use
and public accessibility, but concluded that those harms did not
133
amount to fundamental inconsistency with the Copyright Clause.

127

See id. at 499 (describing the alternate form of the fundamental inconsistency
approach, which I have termed “the fundamental policy form”).
128
See id. at 497-99 (contrasting the fundamental policy form with the Moghadam
approach).
129
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
130
See id. at 1281-82 (concluding that because “fixation, as a constitutional concept, is something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congressional power,” unfixed
works can be protected pursuant to the Commerce Clause without being “fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause”).
131
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
132
See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding section 1201(b) to be constitutional).
133
See id. at 1141-42 (addressing the potential harms of the DMCA and concluding
that the provisions were not “irreconcilably inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause).
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Some commentators have promoted this approach to interclause conflicts—and the anti-bootlegging statutes in particular—as
134
To be sure,
the superior method of constitutional interpretation.
this approach’s view of the Constitution as a whole and its attempt to
look beyond the text and consider underlying policy values are laudable. The other approaches that I have identified do not possess
these features.
However, the fundamental inconsistency approach has its own
problems. In its fundamental policy form, the fundamental inconsistency approach asks courts not only to determine the underlying values
of the Constitution’s provisions, but also to assess their importance.
The result is that, with no rules of application, explicit provisions of the
Constitution can be entirely circumvented—held to be virtually meaningless—because they are not considered “fundamental.”
This is obvious in courts’ and commentators’ application of the
approach to the anti-bootlegging statutes. The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Moghadam can be read either to excuse nonconformity with the
fixation term in the Copyright Clause or to remove the fixation threshold entirely as a prerequisite for copyright protection. Under either
reading, the court disregarded an entire constitutional term with a
well-grounded meaning because it did not find it important enough.
Similarly, William McGinty disregards the fixation requirement entirely in his proposed application of the fundamental inconsistency approach to the anti-bootlegging statutes, claiming that this is acceptable
135
“because of the very wide definition of ‘fixed’ in copyright law.” He
acknowledges that this is the effect of his approach: “This causes
some of the limitations in the Copyright Clause, such as the fixation
136
requirement, to lose effectiveness.”

134

See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 499 (“The fundamental inconsistency test was
applied more satisfactorily in Elcom. . . . [I]ts approach of examining the degree of
harm to copyright-related values as means of determining whether a fundamental inconsistency existed is commendable.”); McGinty, supra note 82, at 339 (“When considering the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging provisions, the fundamental inconsistency approach is best because it gives teeth to all of the limitations in the Copyright
Clause but acknowledges the ambiguous position the provisions have between the
Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause.”).
135
McGinty, supra note 82, at 348.
136
Id. at 350. However, McGinty finds the duration requirement of the Copyright
Clause to represent a fundamental policy value and thus holds the anti-bootlegging
statutes unconstitutional under the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause
alone. See id. at 349 (“Thus, under the fundamental inconsistency test, § 2319A and
§ 1101 are unconstitutional due to their perpetual nature.”).
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Such an argument is unacceptable; the effective repeal of a constitutional provision cannot be tolerated in any constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, it is not clear that courts are skilled in determining the importance of the constitutional provisions at issue. For
example, despite the fixation requirement’s low threshold under
modern copyright law, it has been regarded as serving very important
137
policy goals. However, in determining that fixation was of little importance, the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam erroneously looked to the
definition of “fixed” in the Copyright Act, rather than engaging in a
138
constitutional analysis. Oliar has noted the potential inadequacy of
139
the approach and the ambiguous nature of its application.
In sum, the fundamental inconsistency approach—both in its
clause-bound and fundamental policy value forms—is a beneficial,
though ultimately unsatisfying, method of resolving inter-clause conflicts. Its application is ambiguous, and more importantly, its end result—that entire limitations contained in the Constitution can be disregarded as unimportant—is unacceptable.
Nonetheless, the
approach offers useful features. Most importantly, it necessitates a holistic view of the Constitution, which considers the policy values un-

137

See, e.g., JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 64 (explaining that Congress considered
fixation to be one of two “fundamental criteria of copyright protection” in passing the
Copyright Act (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51-53 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664)). Wendy Gordon also emphasized the central importance of
the fixation requirement in copyright law:
[A]n interdependent world requires demarcations to avoid paralysis and preserve valuable, mutually beneficial reciprocities. . . . Physical boundaries provide one important limit. Copyright provides its own boundaries which, by
and large, substitute well for physical boundaries, both in regard to promoting
transactions and to keeping liability within tolerable limits.
First among these substitute boundaries are copyright’s fixation and demarcation requirements.
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (1989).
138
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1999). The
KISS I court noted this error in the Moghadam court’s reasoning: “[T]he Eleventh Circuit surprisingly relied on a constitutionally untested definition of ‘fixed’ in Title 17 to
argue that fixation may occur simultaneously with transmission and thus has few
boundaries. It is unclear why Congress’ definition of ‘fixed’ informs the constitutional
definition of fixation since these are distinct inquiries.” KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823,
837 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
139
See Oliar, supra note 4, at 499 (“Elcom can be criticized for its assessment of the
DMCA’s copyright-related costs and benefits. It also did not explain when an inconsistency would be ‘fundamental.’”).
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derlying the Constitution’s provisions. This perspective is necessary to
a successful method of constitutional interpretation.
III. A PROPOSED METHOD OF ANALYSIS: HOLISTIC CATEGORIZATION
As demonstrated in Part II, the methods that courts and commentators have used to determine the constitutionality of statutes when an
inter-clause conflict exists are lacking. In this Part, I propose a method of analysis for resolving inter-clause conflicts that I term “holistic
categorization.” This method draws from the advantages of existing
methods of analysis, yet avoids the flaws of those methods. First, I
present holistic categorization in detail. Second, I offer a justification
and defense of the method, showing that the holistic categorization
approach fits with a proper account of the Constitution, avoids many
of the flaws of the existing methods of analysis, and even comports
with Supreme Court precedent.
A. The Method of Holistic Categorization
To determine the constitutionality of a statute in the context of
inter-clause conflicts, I propose a method of analysis in which an intuitive two-step process is undertaken. First, a court should determine
within which of the Constitution’s clauses the statute at issue falls.
Second, a court should apply the limitations and underlying policy
considerations of all of the applicable clauses to the statute. This method can appropriately be termed “holistic categorization,” because it
takes a categorical approach to statutes and a deeply holistic view of
the Constitution.
The first step of holistic categorization is to identify the constitutional clause—or clauses—under which the statute at issue is to be
analyzed. This is a “modified categorization” based on the strict cate140
My modgorization approach that courts have applied in the past.
ification to this approach entails considering the scope or realm of a
granted power before looking to the limitations of that power to determine whether the statute at issue falls within it. In considering the
realm of a power’s control, rules of definition that are strict and formalistic cannot be used. While the conception must be grounded in the
language of the Constitution’s clause, it should not turn on the parsing of sentence structure into “constitutive” and “limiting” terms to
140

For a discussion and analysis of the strict categorization approach, see supra
Section II.A.
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establish a rigid definition, as the clause-bound form of the funda141
mental inconsistency approach attempts to do.
Instead, to determine the proper realm of a power’s control, one must look to the subject matter that the clause concerns, the legislative action that the
clause is designed to address, and the underlying policy of the clause.
Once a court considers these factors and forms a concept of scope,
it must determine whether the statute falls within that scope. In doing
so, the direct legislative action should be considered, disregarding ancillary effects. Beyond the direct action taken, the court should also
consider the legislative history, intent, and statutory construction. Statutes that approximate the subject matter the constitutional clause
controls—for example, “copyright-like” statutes—may fall within the
scope of the clause. Finally, the court should recognize that statutes
may fall within the scope of more than one constitutional clause.
In the second step of holistic categorization, the court should apply all of the limitations of the clauses identified in the first step to the
statute at issue. Unlike under the fundamental inconsistency approach, the relative worthiness of the limitations should not be consi142
dered; rather, the limitations and restrictions explicit in the clause
should be strictly applied. The court may also assess the policy concerns underlying the clause at issue to determine whether the statute
is contrary to those policy objectives. If a statute violates a clause within which it falls, the statute should be held unconstitutional. Similarly, if a statute significantly undermines the policy objectives of a clause
within which it falls, it should also be held unconstitutional.
B. Justification
The holistic categorization approach that I have proposed is, in
many ways, a synthesis of the useful features of existing methods that
eschews many of the flaws in those methods. Important principles of
constitutional interpretation that the Supreme Court and noted
commentators have identified guide the approach.
1. The Holistic View of the Constitution
Holistic categorization is, unsurprisingly, grounded in a holistic
view of the Constitution. The approach endorses an account of the
141

For a discussion and analysis of the clause-bound form of the fundamental inconsistency approach, see supra subsection II.C.1.
142
For a discussion of the fundamental inconsistency approach, see supra Section
II.C.
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Constitution—and particularly Congress’s enumerated powers—as
not merely a collection of grants, commands, and limitations, but as
a document that is greater than the sum of its parts. It recognizes
that in assessing the constitutionality of a given statute, one cannot
read each constitutional clause independently of the others. Any
view of a constitutional grant of authority must bear in mind other
related provisions of the Constitution. Laurence Tribe, among others, endorses the holistic view:
Read in isolation, most of the Constitution’s provisions make only a
highly limited kind of sense. Only as an interconnected whole do these
provisions meaningfully constitute a frame of government for a nation of
states. . . . Like any blueprint of a complex architectural edifice, moreover, the whole constituted . . . is plainly more than the sum of its parts.
There is no way to avoid at least some reading between the lines if one is
143
to make coherent sense of the edifice in its entirety.

The holistic perspective is not an entirely novel principle of inter144
pretation, as it tracks closely with canons of statutory interpretation.
This view should be distinguished from the view the strict categorization, strictly alternative, and to an extent, fundamental inconsistency
approaches implicitly take. Both the strict categorization approach and
the strictly alternative approach consider the Constitution’s provisions
in a vacuum, applying only the limitations and grants contained in one
145
clause without considering other clauses that may apply. The fundamental inconsistency approach does recognize the interrelatedness of
146
However, because the approach only
the Constitution’s provisions.
allows the limitations of one provision to inform the analysis of constitutionality under an alternate provision when it considers those limitations “fundamental,” the approach does not commit itself as strongly to
the holistic view of the Constitution as holistic categorization does.

143

Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235-36 (1995).
144
See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed. 2009) (“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each
part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section to
produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the
one section to be construed.” (footnote omitted)). In fact, the entire holistic categorization approach parallels well-established doctrines of statutory interpretation, particularly because it applies all relevant, specific limitations to the statute under examination. See infra subsection III.B.2.
145
See supra Sections II.A and II.B.
146
See supra Section II.C.
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2. The Two-Step Analysis
The detailed two-step analysis I propose follows established principles of constitutional interpretation. It also draws from the useful
features of existing methods of interpretation while avoiding many of
their drawbacks.
A modified categorization, the first step in the holistic categorization analysis, is necessary in any serious method of interpretation. Any
assessment of the constitutionality of a given statute must involve some
form of categorization. Before determining whether constitutional
authority exists or is violated, one must know where in the Constitution
147
to look for it.
The modified categorization that I have proposed,
however, recognizes the flaws in an analysis that sets strict rules to create
148
a rigid definition of the scope or realm of a statute. The modified categorization instead identifies several important factors that should be
used to form a general conception, rather than a rigid definition, of the
realm with which the constitutional clause concerns itself. Doing so acknowledges that clauses in the Constitution differ in their language,
underlying policy, and structure: some contain preambles; others contain clear, strict limitations; and others contain no limitations at all.
With such variance, any attempt to create a strict set of rules to clearly
define a clause’s realm will create more problems than it will solve.
Once the scope or realm of a clause’s authority has been conceptualized, the holistic categorization approach proceeds to determine
149
By considering
whether the statute at issue falls within that scope.
the direct action of the statute, rather than its ancillary effects, the
holistic categorization approach acknowledges that the Constitution
grants Congress a wide array of powers and means to achieve its objectives. In this way, the approach also recognizes that in some circumstances, ends may not be prohibited simply because certain means are.

147

Thus, the strict categorization approach is not the only approach to apply some
form of categorization. The strictly alternative approach requires one to determine in
which constitutional clauses the statute at issue can find authority. Likewise, when using the fundamental inconsistency approach, one must determine which clause’s limitations and policies apply before determining whether fundamental limitations or policy are violated.
148
The strict categorization approach and the clause-bound form of the fundamental inconsistency approach revealed the flaws of such an approach. See also Oliar,
supra note 4, at 496-97 (criticizing “formalistic argumentation”).
149
The modified categorization approach accepts that some statutes fall within
more than one constitutional clause and thus avoids the criticism that the strict categorization approach pigeonholes statutes into a single category. See supra Section II.A.
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The Supreme Court has used such a principle of constitutional in150
terpretation, most notably in South Dakota v. Dole. In Dole, the Court
held that Congress could use its Spending Clause power to provide
strong incentives for states to raise their drinking ages to twenty-one
years, even though the Twenty-First Amendment prohibited Congress
151
In its reasoning, the Court exfrom setting a drinking age directly.
plained: “[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated
legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the
152
The
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”
holistic categorization approach to inter-clause conflicts adopts this important principle, which courts and commentators have not considered.
Perhaps most importantly, the holistic categorization approach
entirely rejects the Second Circuit’s ruling in Martignon that a statute
cannot fall within the scope of a specific power if it approximates, yet is
not entirely, the exact subject matter concerned (e.g., it is “copyright153
like”). Such statutes can—and in most cases should—be determined
to fall within the scope of a clause and thus be subject to its limitations.
This rule of interpretation takes guidance from the Supreme
154
Court’s analysis of the Lanham Act in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cen155
tury Fox Film Corp.
In Dastar, the Court rejected an argument that
the Lanham Act accorded “special treatment to communicative products [because such a construction] causes the Lanham Act to conflict
156
with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically.”
The Court cited an earlier opinion holding that “‘[i]n general, unless
an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an
157
Most notably, the Court exitem, it will be subject to copying.’”
pressed a concern that allowing a cause of action under the Lanham
158
The Court went
Act “would create a species of mutant copyright law.”
150

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id. at 212 (“Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to state action . . . is a
valid use of the spending power.”).
152
Id. at 207 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65
(1936)). Although the Court’s rule in Dole concerned Congress’s spending power,
there is no reason that one cannot derive a broader principle regarding the distinction
between prohibited ends and means. As discussed in subsection III.B.3, this broader
principle comports with the Court’s ruling in Heart of Atlanta Motel as well.
153
See supra subsection I.B.2.
154
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
155
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
156
Id. at 33.
157
Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
158
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
151
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on to explain that a Lanham Act cause of action would violate the du159
ration requirement of the Copyright Clause.
Courts and commentators have wrongly ignored this important
case. Dastar stands for the proposition that “copyright-like” statutes
must fall subject to the requirements of the Copyright Clause. To
hold, as the Second Circuit did, that such statutes may instead be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is to create the very “mutant
copyright law” against which the Supreme Court warned.
Finally, the second step of the holistic categorization analysis applies all limitations that the relevant clauses contain, regardless of
whether a court considers them “fundamental.” This rule is derived
from the Supreme Court’s clear objective of enforcing the Constitution’s explicit limitations. The Court made this objective evident with
160
respect to the Copyright Clause in Dastar and more generally in
Railway Labor. In Railway Labor, the Court insisted on applying the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, even though one
161
could certainly label the statute at issue a commercial regulation.
To do otherwise “would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation
162
on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”
The holistic categorization approach recognizes that the Constitution’s limitations must be given force. This view comports with the
fundamental rules of statutory interpretation. In 2009, the Supreme
Court stated that “one of the most basic interpretive canons” is that
“‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insig163
nificant.’” Thus, the principle is well-grounded, even though it has
been ignored by the fundamental inconsistency approach, which even
its proponents admit allows some constitutional provisions to lose
164
Furthermore, holding all of the Constitution’s
their effectiveness.
limitations as necessary avoids the more pragmatic problem of courts
165
misjudging the importance of constitutional limitations.

159

See id. at 37 (“To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that [the Lanham Act]
created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.”).
160
See id.
161
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982).
162
Id. at 469.
163
Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)) (alteration in Corley).
164
See supra subsection II.C.2.
165
Subsection II.C.2 discusses this criticism of the fundamental inconsistency
approach.
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3. Reconciliation with Supreme Court Precedent
In their attempts to determine the proper method of analyzing
inter-clause conflicts, the anti-bootlegging courts have looked primari166
ly to the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of
167
168
Atlanta Motel, and Railway Labor. In many instances, the courts had
169
difficulty reconciling these cases.
The holistic categorization approach that I present fits comfortably within the Supreme Court’s reasoning in these three cases.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Trade-Mark Cases fits within
the holistic categorization approach’s first step. The Court essentially
held the trademark statute at issue to fall outside both the scope of
170
171
the Copyright Clause and the scope of the Commerce Clause.
Translating this decision into the language of the holistic categorization approach, the Supreme Court established a conception of the
realms that the Copyright Clause and Commerce Clause controlled
172
and then found the trademark statute to fall outside of these realms.
The second step of the analysis was unnecessary, as there were no limitations to apply. The statute was unconstitutional.
One can similarly apply the holistic categorization approach to
173
the Court’s decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel. As discussed, the most
plausible interpretation of the Court’s decision in light of the Civil
174
Rights Cases, which the Court elected not to revisit, is that it considered the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be outside the scope of the Four175
teenth Amendment and within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
This account fits well within the holistic categorization approach.
In holistic categorization terms, the Supreme Court held in the
Civil Rights Cases that the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
166

100 U.S. 82 (1879).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
168
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
169
See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “there is some tension between” the cases).
170
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (“[W]e are unable to see any such power in
the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and
discoveries.”).
171
Id. at 95-99 (reasoning that the trademark statute falls outside the scope of the
authority granted by the Commerce Clause).
172
For a more detailed account of the Trade-Mark Cases opinion, see supra notes
113-14 and accompanying text.
173
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
174
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 103-10.
167
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Amendment was limited to federal regulation of state action to en176
force the Fourteenth Amendment.
Looking to the direct action of
the Civil Rights Act—the regulation of private parties, not state
action—the Court held that the Act could not be categorized as a Sec177
tion 5 law. The Court endorsed this interpretation in Heart of Atlanta Motel, holding that the motivation of ending racial discrimination
was permissible so long as the Constitution authorized the means—the
178
direct action—that Congress took. Thus, the holistic categorization
approach would follow a similar analysis for the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and find it to be outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment but constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the holistic categorization approach perfectly aligns with
179
the Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Labor. In Railway Labor, the
Supreme Court effectively followed the holistic categorization approach
180
In finding the statute at issue to
without using the terms I propose.
fall within the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, the Court looked to the
176

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws.”).
177
See id. at 24-25 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize the
Civil Rights Act).
178
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court stated:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas
rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Congress
was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does
not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which
empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for
the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also
deemed a moral and social wrong.
379 U.S. at 257.
179
Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). For a more detailed
discussion of the facts of the case and the Court’s opinion, see supra Section I.A.
180
Earlier in this Comment, I described the Court’s decision as falling within the
strict categorization approach. See supra Section II.A. This is because although the
Court acknowledged the overlap between the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy
Clause, see Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 468-69, it declined to categorize the statute at issue as
both a bankruptcy statute and a commerce statute. The holistic categorization
approach would include the formality of characterizing the statute as falling within
both powers. However, with respect to these two constitutional clauses, there is no
practical difference, since the approach applies the limitations in all applicable clauses
and the Commerce Clause contains no express limitations.
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same sources and factors I suggest: the substance of the statute and its
direct action, its legislative history, and the underlying policy of the
181
Once the Court determined that the
constitutional clause at issue.
statute fell within Congress’s bankruptcy power, it applied the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity limitation—as the holistic categorization ap182
proach would do—and held the statute unconstitutional.
IV. APPLYING HOLISTIC CATEGORIZATION TO
THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES
With the holistic categorization approach now clearly established,
it can be applied to the specific inter-clause conflict this Comment has
highlighted—that created by the anti-bootlegging statutes Congress
183
passed as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). Section A of this Part applies the first step of the holistic categorization
approach, modified categorization, to the anti-bootlegging statutes. It
finds that both the civil and criminal statutes approximate a form of
copyright protection and fall within the scope of both the Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause. Section B of this Part applies the
second step of the holistic categorization approach, which concerns
limitations of the applicable clauses. When the Copyright Clause’s
limitations are applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes, it becomes
clear that the statute violates the clause’s durational requirement, as
well as perhaps the clause’s fixation requirement. Because the statutes
violate at least one constitutional limitation, they are unconstitutional.
A. Categorizing the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
1. Conceptualizing the Copyright Clause’s Realm
The holistic categorization approach begins by using the relevant constitutional clauses to form a conception of the realms in
which the clauses operate. The anti-bootlegging statutes implicate
184
the Copyright Clause, so it will be the primary focus of the inquiry.
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress “[t]o promote the
181

See Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 467-69 (addressing the statute’s substance, the statute’s legislative history, and the policy of the Bankruptcy Clause).
182
Id. at 469-73.
183
The civil anti-bootlegging provision is found at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006), and
the criminal provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
184
Subsection IV.A.3 of this Comment makes the uncontroversial determination
that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the very broad realm of the Commerce
Clause.
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ185
ings and Discoveries.” Several factors are involved in establishing a
conception of the Copyright Clause.
One must first consider the subject matter that the clause concerns. The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]o comprehend the
scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of his186
tory is worth a volume of logic.’”
History reveals that Congress has
used the Copyright Clause to protect a wide range of subject matter,
187
which has expanded over time. Perhaps the best conception of the
Copyright Clause’s focus is simply the copying of original, “intangible
188
products of the mind.”
Second, the analysis turns to the type of congressional action with
which the Copyright Clause is concerned. The Copyright Clause au189
thorizes Congress to “secur[e] . . . exclusive Right[s].” In Martignon,
the Second Circuit understood this phrase to mean “to create, bestow,
and allocate . . . rights” and based its entire constitutional analysis on
190
this interpretation. The court’s analysis of what rights the Copyright
Clause concerned centered on its comparison of the criminal anti191
This line of reabootlegging statute to the existing Copyright Act.
soning is erroneous, however, because the question is not the scope of
rights that Congress has decided to secure through the Copyright Act,
but rather the scope of rights that the Constitution authorizes Con192
gress to secure. There simply is not enough information available to
define precisely what it means to secure rights to authors. In the case
of the Copyright Clause, one can consider the type of action specified
in the clause, but that certainly cannot serve as the sole guidepost in
construing the scope of the Copyright Clause.

185

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
187
See generally JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 14-25 (tracing the history of AngloAmerican copyright law from the Statute of Anne, through the Copyright Act of 1909,
to the Copyright Act of 1976).
188
Id. at 3.
189
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
190
United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
191
See id. at 151.
192
See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.07 (“The Copyright Clause of the
Constitution vest [sic] in Congress the authority to enact copyright legislation, but
does not in itself command that copyright legislation must be enacted. Congress is
given discretion whether in fact to enact such legislation, and if so, as to its scope.”).
186
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However, the third factor to be considered in forming a conceptual scope of the Copyright Clause, the underlying purpose or policy
of the clause, is very useful. Understanding the purpose of copyright
is essential to forming a conception of the clause’s scope. This is because the Copyright Clause is one of the only constitutional provisions
that contains a policy statement. The clause states that the purpose of
Congress’s power is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
193
One must consider the inclusion of this policy statement—
Arts.”
which makes clear that more than the simple creation of private
194
property rights guides Congress’s copyright power —in forming a
conceptual scope of the Copyright Clause.
The importance of this policy is evident in the history of copyright
law in the United States. American copyright law is unique in that the
overarching social policy contained in the Copyright Clause constantly
guides it. As Joyce and coauthors explain, “U.S. copyright law has
been conceived as an instrument of national cultural policy, rather
than a mere scheme of private rights. From its inception, it has been
the vehicle for the balancing of private proprietary claims and the
195
public interest in access to information resources.” Joyce and coauthors further explain that this underlying social policy has more than
“rhetorical significance”; rather, it has shaped the modern copyright
196
doctrine and is at the root of the language of the Copyright Clause.
In particular, this public policy is the source of the “limited Times”
197
Because the Copyright Clause embodies such a strong,
provision.
important social policy, one must construe its scope broadly.
2. Determining Whether the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Fall Within
the Scope of the Copyright Clause
With a general conception of the scope of the Copyright Clause
established, it must now be determined whether the anti-bootlegging
193

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 19 (“The constitutional language—which
does not even employ the term ‘copyright’—seems to suggest that the dominant purpose of the Framers was to promote the creation (and, by implication, the dissemination) of knowledge, so as to enhance public welfare. This goal is to be achieved
through provision of an economic incentive: a monopoly right given for ‘limited Times,’
whose direct beneficiary is the ‘Author.’”).
195
Id. at 988.
196
Id.
197
See id. (“Where copyright doctrine is concerned, it has had an important generative influence. It explains the ‘limited Times’ language of the constitutional Copyright Clause.”).
194
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statutes fall within that scope. The holistic categorization approach
considers several factors in making this determination. Three of these
factors are relevant to the anti-bootlegging statutes: what the statute
directly does, legislative history and congressional intent, and statutory
construction. Consideration of these three factors makes clear that
the anti-bootlegging statutes closely resemble copyright law.
Analyzing the substance of the anti-bootlegging statutes—what
they directly do—is the most difficult. Although the statutes are, in
many ways, different from traditional copyright law, they nonetheless
afford copyright-like protection. Nimmer and Nimmer reason that
under the statutes, musical performances “are accorded something
198
approximating, but not equaling, copyright protection.” They note
that the anti-bootlegging statutes confer rights that are “comparable”
to those conferred by traditional copyright: the right to control unau199
Furthorized reproductions and the right to public distribution.
thermore, the anti-bootlegging statutes also “confer[] a limited
right—communication of a live musical performance,” which occupies
200
It should be noted
an odd place within traditional copyright law.
here that the Second Circuit erroneously reasoned that a criminal
201
The Copyright Act itself
provision could not be a copyright law.
provides numerous criminal penalties for copyright infringement
that—like the criminal anti-bootlegging provision—parallel its civil
202
In fact, the Uruguay Round Agreements, the agreeprotections.
198

See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][1].
See id. (“Two of the rights belonging to traditional copyright proprietors are to
control unauthorized reproductions and public distributions of their works. Chapter
11 accords comparable rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
200
Id. Nimmer and Nimmer state, “That right is broader than the comparable
right given to sound recordings, which lack any performance component. By contrast,
it is narrower than the right conferred on, for example, musical works, rights in which
are not limited to live performance.” Id.
201
See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It is a criminal statute, falling in its codification . . . between the law criminalizing certain copyright infringement and the law criminalizing ‘trafficking in counterfeit goods or services.’ It is, perhaps, analogous to the law of criminal trespass. Rather than creating a
right in the performer him-or [sic] herself, it creates a power in the government to
protect the interest of performers from commercial predations.”). It is surprising that
the Second Circuit even acknowledged other criminal copyright laws, because the existence of such laws defeats the court’s argument. It is also interesting that in its analysis, the court never mentioned that Congress passed the criminal provision in conjunction with the civil provision, which is nearly identical and falls under the same title as
the Copyright Act. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
202
See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 915-17 (detailing the Copyright Act’s numerous criminal penalties); see also McGinty, supra note 82, at 343-44 (disagreeing with the
Second Circuit’s reasoning on this ground).
199
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ments that Congress implemented through the anti-bootlegging statutes, explicitly mandate that signatories “shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of will203
ful . . . copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”
That one of the anti-bootlegging statutes carries criminal penalties
is inconsequential to the analysis of whether the statutes fall within the
scope of the Copyright Clause. Looking only to the substance of the
statutes, it is apparent that while they do not give the full range of protections offered by modern copyright law, they nonetheless resemble
some form of traditional copyright protection.
Turning next to the legislative history of the anti-bootlegging statutes, there is no doubt that until their constitutionality was scrutinized, all involved considered the statutes to be intellectual property
laws. Congress enacted the statutes as part of the URAA, which
adopted the TRIPs, a massive international intellectual property trea204
ty, into law.
The very name of the treaty with which the statutes
were passed to comply—the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights—strongly suggests that the antibootlegging statutes are within the realm of the Copyright Clause. If
this evidence is somehow insufficient, the statutes’ legislative history
205
supports the conclusion as well.
Considering the anti-bootlegging provisions’ statutory construction similarly points towards placing the statutes within the category of
copyright. As the district court in Martignon noted, the civil antibootlegging provision is located within the same title of the United
States Code as the Copyright Act, “almost as a sub-set of the Copyright
206
Act.” The criminal anti-bootlegging provision appears in the United
States Code in the same title as, and immediately following, the crimi207
nal copyright-infringement provision. On top of all of this, the sta203

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 8, art. 61.
204
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 8E.01[B] (“In 1994, the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act added to the picture a very brief Chapter 11, consisting of only
one section. That section regulates the unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound
recordings and music videos. . . . In order to comply with the obligations of the United
States as a signatory to the TRIPs annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement,
Congress added this protection for such performances.” (footnotes omitted)).
205
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(detailing numerous passages in the statutes’ legislative history that make clear that
these statutes—and the URAA more generally—were considered copyright laws), vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
206
Id. at 421.
207
See id. at 421-22.

SILA REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1182

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

3/14/2011 12:29 PM

[Vol. 159: 1141
208

tute explicitly adopts the definitions of the Copyright Act and makes
209
available “most civil remedies of copyright law.”
Almost all courts and commentators seem to agree that the anti210
bootlegging statutes provide at least “copyright-like” protections.
Some commentators have argued, however, that because the statutes
do not provide full, traditional copyright protection, they cannot be
211
There are several serious flaws in this
considered copyright laws.
line of reasoning.
First, the argument makes the common mistake of judging the statutes by comparing them to the Copyright Act. As discussed above,
the proper inquiry is whether the statutes fall within the constitutional—not statutory—scope of copyright. While the detailed provisions
of the Copyright Act are useful in this analysis, comparisons to it
should not be determinative.
Second, to accept these commentators’ arguments is to completely disregard a legislative history and statutory construction that point
strongly in favor of categorizing the anti-bootlegging statutes as copyright laws. While these factors should not be determinative, when
they point this strongly, they ought not be ignored.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, to accept these commentators’ arguments is also to disregard the important social policy underlying the Copyright Clause. To place laws that do not entirely reproduce modern copyright law outside of the Copyright Clause turns the
clause’s underlying policy on its head. It would mean that the Constitution, rather than identifying a narrow group of intellectual works as
important enough to warrant copyright protection, instead makes this
group more difficult to protect. Allowing all “copyright-like” laws to es208

See id. at 422 (“And, the ‘Definitions’ provision of the anti-bootlegging statute,
rather than defining crucial terms, such as ‘fixed,’ ‘musical work,’ and ‘sound recordings,’ adopts the definitions of these terms as stated in Title 17—the Copyright Title.”
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(e) (2006))).
209
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.03[B][2][a].
210
See, e.g., Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22 (“Based on the anti-bootlegging statute’s language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyright-like regulation.”); KISS I,
350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“This Court does not believe there can be
much debate that § 1101 is a copyright-related statute.”); Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1181 (2005) (characterizing the statutes as “quasi-copyright”).
211
See, e.g., Mandell, supra note 9, at 700-03 (arguing that, although the antibootlegging statutes “closely mirror the reproduction and distribution rights” of the
Copyright Act, they are “outside the scope of the Copyright Clause”); Danitz, supra
note 210, at 1180-83 (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall outside of the
Copyright Clause).
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cape the requirements of the Copyright Clause creates the very “species of mutant copyright law” that the Supreme Court warned against
212
in Dastar. To prevent such an anomaly, the anti-bootlegging statutes
must fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause and be subject to its
limitations.
3. Determining Whether the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Fall Within
the Scope of the Commerce Clause
One unique feature of the holistic categorization analysis is that it
allows statutes to fall within the scope of more than one constitutional
power. Courts must thus determine whether the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within another clause of the Constitution, namely the Commerce Clause. Fortunately for this analysis, the Commerce Clause’s
213
In United States v. Lopez, the Subroad authority is well-established.
preme Court held that the clause grants Congress the authority to regulate activities that “substantially affect interstate [or foreign] com214
merce.” This is the scope of the Commerce Clause.
In the case of the anti-bootlegging statutes, it is very easy to conclude, as the Eleventh Circuit in Moghadam did in its excellent analysis, that the regulated subject matter substantially affects interstate
commerce. As the Moghadam court correctly noted, “[t]he link between bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce and com215
merce with foreign nations is self-evident.” There are myriad con216
nections to interstate and foreign commerce.
Beyond these,
however, one need only look to the history of the anti-bootlegging
statutes to see the obvious connection to interstate, and particularly
foreign, commerce. Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statutes
as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which implemented

212

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); see
also supra subsection III.B.2.
213
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 242 (“Practically speaking, [the Commerce
Clause] has been the authority for a broad array of federal legislation, ranging from
criminal statutes to securities laws to civil rights laws to environmental laws.”).
214
514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
215
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999).
216
See, e.g., id. (“Bootleggers depress the legitimate markets because demand is
satisfied through unauthorized channels. . . . [P]erforming artists who attract bootleggers are those who are sufficiently popular that their appeal crosses state or national
lines. The very reason Congress prohibited this conduct is because of the deleterious
economic effect on the recording industry.” (citation omitted)).
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217

the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property protocol.
It is
nonsensical to claim that the anti-bootlegging statutes, passed pursuant to the World Trade Organization’s authority, do not affect
commerce and thus to deny that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall
218
within the Commerce Clause’s broad scope.
B. Applying the Relevant Limitations to the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
Under the holistic categorization analysis, once a court determines that the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the scope of both
the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause, the court must apply
the limitations of those clauses. The Supreme Court has stated that
the Commerce Clause does not “contain[] an affirmative limitation or
219
By contrast, the Copyright
restriction upon Congress’ power.”
Clause does contain limitations. Thus, only the Copyright Clause is
220
relevant at this stage of the analysis. Like most courts and commentators, I will focus on the Copyright Clause’s duration and fixation requirements in this Section, although some commentators have suggested that additional limitations in the Copyright Clause exist and
221
should be applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes. It is obvious that
granting perpetual protection violates the Copyright Clause’s duration
requirement, and it is probable, although less certain, that the antibootlegging statutes protect unfixed works and thus violate the Copyright Clause’s fixation requirement.

217

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 8, art. 7 (setting the objectives of the agreement as protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights “to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare”
(emphasis added)).
218
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.05[A] (“Given how broadly the
reach of [the Commerce Clause] has been construed, it would be difficult to maintain
that accords mandated by the World Trade Organization fall outside the type of trade
and commerce that Congress can legitimately regulate.” (footnote omitted)).
219
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468 (1982).
220
See id. at 467-72 (contrasting the Commerce Clause with the Bankruptcy Clause).
221
See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 4, at 489-95 (contending that the anti-bootlegging
statutes, when tested against the “Writings” term, the “limited Times” term, the “Authors” term, the “Progress” language, and the originality requirement, may violate the
Copyright Clause’s restrictive grant of power).
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1. Applying the “Limited Times” Requirement
The Copyright Clause states that in securing rights to authors,
222
Congress must give such rights “for limited Times.”
The Supreme
Court has held that any protection granted under the Copyright
223
Because the anti-bootlegging
Clause must, at some point, end.
statutes do not include a statement of duration (i.e., when the protections will expire), the statutes violate this very basic limitation. On this
224
question, courts and commentators agree almost unanimously.
The notable exception to this virtual unanimity is Brian Danitz,
who argues that the anti-bootlegging statues are consistent with the
“limited Times” requirement “because a live performance is inherently
225
limited in duration.” Dotan Oliar has sufficiently responded to this
faulty reasoning, noting that Danitz ignores the anti-bootlegging statute’s prohibitions on broadcasting and trafficking, which are perpetual, and ignores these statutes’ infinite retroactive application, as
226
The anti-bootlegging statutes plainly
shown by the KISS litigation.
violate the “limited Times” requirement under the Copyright Clause
and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Applying the Fixation Requirement
The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to protect authors’
227
“Writings.”
The Supreme Court has held this term to mean that
copyright protection can only be extended to “any physical rendering
228
A recorded
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”
229
musical performance falls within this requirement. The question of
222

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2003) (recognizing that the Copyright Clause requires that the duration of a copyright be “appropriately ‘limited’”).
224
See Oliar, supra note 4, at 491 & n.127 (“The overwhelming majority of courts
and commentators suggest that the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the limited times
requirement.”).
225
Danitz, supra note 210, at 1198-99.
226
See Oliar, supra note 4, at 491-92.
227
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
228
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 9, § 1.08[C][2] (“[I]n order for a work to constitute a writing, it must be
embodied in some tangible form. If the word ‘writings’ is to be given any meaning
whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote ‘some material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))).
229
See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that a recorded musical performance
“may” satisfy the fixation requirement).
223
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whether the anti-bootlegging statutes violate this requirement is more
difficult than the duration question. Most courts and commentators
that consider the requirement relevant believe the anti-bootlegging
statutes violate the fixation requirement because they protect unfixed
230
works, such as live musical performances.
This reasoning has one glaring flaw: the performances that the
anti-bootlegging statutes protect have been fixed—by the infringer.
After all, if an audience member heard a live performance one
night, committed it to memory, and then perfectly recreated the
performance later, either on record or live, she would not violate the
anti-bootlegging statutes. Judge Rea recognized this nuanced dis231
tinction in KISS I.
The argument that infringement can satisfy the fixation require232
ment raises interesting questions.
If courts accepted the argument,
the threshold for fixation, already extremely low, would reach the brink
of meaninglessness. This question may ultimately need to be decided
on policy grounds. For the fixation requirement to retain any meaning,
a line must be drawn. This debate, however, is moot with respect to the
anti-bootlegging statutes: the statutes are clearly unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s complex structure grants the federal government many powers—both broad and narrow in scope—and restricts
the exercise of those powers. When two grants of power conflict, a
230

See, e.g., Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24 (holding that the criminal antibootlegging statute violates the fixation requirement). See generally Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce
Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661 (2002)
(arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes clearly violate the fixation requirement of
the Copyright Clause and that this limitation cannot be circumvented).
231
KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Since the allegedly unauthorized recording has already been made, that existing recording may satisfy the fixation requirement.”), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
232
The Copyright Act requires the work’s author to authorize fixation. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “fixed” to mean fixed “by or under the authority of the
author”). Whether such authorization is constitutionally required is a separate question.
One interesting answer that future study might explore is that the term “their” in the
Copyright Clause requires authorization: if fixation is only accomplished by an infringer, a “Writing” cannot rightly be considered to belong to the author. See U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .” (emphasis added)).

SILA REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Mixing Up the Medicine

3/14/2011 12:29 PM

1187

fundamental question of constitutional interpretation arises. Such a
situation rarely occurs, but the anti-bootlegging statutes present a perfect model for understanding and confronting the constitutional
question of inter-clause conflicts.
In this Comment, I presented various judicial and scholarly approaches to inter-clause conflicts, demonstrating their inadequacies
while highlighting their useful features. I offered my own proposal,
“holistic categorization,” as a plausible solution.
I do not offer this approach as a panacea. Rather, I acknowledge
that the approach may possess its own flaws. For example, by eschewing strict rules in favor of a multitude of factors that are weighed differently on a case-by-case basis, the holistic categorization approach
might be faulted for being unpredictable. Nonetheless, I argue that
this approach is the best means of analyzing inter-clause conflicts. In
fact, a lack of predictability may be beneficial. If courts assert constitutional limitations, Congress may be forced to consider whether it
possesses the authority to undertake actions before legislating, rather
than assuming that its power is unlimited (as it appears to have done
233
The approach may
with respect to the anti-bootlegging statutes).
also force Congress to consider whether the action it wishes to take
aligns with the policy objectives underlying the Constitution’s grants
of power, and this surely cannot be viewed as a negative outcome.
My hope is that this Comment contributes to the emerging legal literature on inter-clause conflicts. As scholars debate this difficult issue,
useful thoughts and methods continue to emerge. My analysis has far
from exhausted the topic. Additional questions, such as whether the
practical effect of holistic categorization will be beneficial from a legislative, judicial, or even societal standpoint and whether other possibilities for inter-clause conflicts exist, are open to future examination. My
hope is that this Comment will take the debate one step further, forcing courts and commentators to consider difficult issues of constitutional limitations and underlying policy and adding another voice to
the longstanding discussion of the Constitution and its limitations.
233

At the start of the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives amended its
rules to require a member who introduces legislation to submit “a statement citing as
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution
to enact the bill or joint resolution.” H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). Such
a statement from the sponsor of legislation would certainly be a useful, though far
from determinative, consideration in the holistic categorization analysis. One can
wonder whether Congress might have given thought to the constitutional limitations of
the Copyright Clause had this rule been in effect at the time of the anti-bootlegging
statutes’ passage.

